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Abstract—Text documents play significant roles in decision
making and scientific research. Under federal regulations, documents (e.g., pathology records) containing personally identifiable
information cannot be shared freely, unless properly sanitized.
Generally speaking, document sanitization consists of finding
and hiding personally identifiable information. The first task has
received much attention from the research community, but the
main strategy for the second task has been to simply remove
personal identifiers and very sensitive information (e.g., diseases
and treatment). It is not hard to see that if important information
(e.g., diagnoses and personal medical histories) is completely
removed from pathology records, these records are no longer
readable, and even worse, they no longer contain sufficient
information for research purposes.
Observe that the sensitive information “tuberculosis” can be
replaced with the less sensitive term “infectious disease”. That
is, instead of simply removing sensitive terms, these terms can
be hidden by more general but semantically related terms to
protect sensitive information, without unnecessarily degrading
the amount of information contained in the document. Based on
this observation, the main contribution of this paper is to provide
a novel information theoretic approach to text sanitization, and
develop efficient heuristics to sanitize text documents.

I. I NTRODUCTION
Medical documents, such as pathology records, play significant roles in detecting, verifying and monitoring new
diagnostic examinations and treatment methodologies. However, under federal regulations, e.g., the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) [5], because these
records often contain sensitive or confidential information,
they cannot be distributed freely. As a consequence, they
cannot be used for medical research, e.g., to discover cures
for life threatening diseases, unless properly sanitized. In
general, document sanitization consists of two main tasks:
(1) Identifying personally identifiable information, e.g., as
defined by the HIPAA safe harbor rules, and (2) “hiding” the
discovered identifiers. Unfortunately, medically relevant terms
can often be identifying, for example conditions related to the
disease (such as weight, which can assist in identification.) To
truly sanitize documents requires hiding such relatively unique
information, which likely goes beyond obvious identifiers.
The first task has received much attention from the research community, and many commercial products have been
developed to detect personal identifiable attributes. As for
the second task, the main approach adopted by current text
sanitization techniques is to simply remove personal identifiers (names, dates, locations, diagnoses, etc.,) to prevent re-
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identification of text documents. It is not hard to see that
if diagnoses and personal medical histories are completely
removed from pathology records, these records are no longer
readable, and even worse, they no longer contain sufficient
information to allow biomedical researchers to develop treatments for fatal diseases. This can be illustrated by the following example.
Suppose a phrase “Uses marijuana for pain” is contained in
a medical report. The traditional techniques can sanitize this
phrase by “blacking out” sensitive information, such as the
drug used or diagnosis, turn the phrase into the meaningless
for
”. This can cause sanitized texts to be no
“uses
longer readable, and hence, document utility is unnecessarily
degraded. More specifically, let d refer to the sample text in
Figure 1(a), where Sacramento, marijuana, lumbar pain
and liver cancer are the sensitive terms. Let d∗ refer to the
sanitized text in Figure 1(b), which is the result of removing
sensitive words from d. Clearly, d∗ is useless for analyzing
disease epidemics. Let d† refer to the sanitized text in Figure
1(c), where sensitive words are replaced by more general terms
(using the hypernym trees presented in Figure 2, where a word
w in a given tree has a broader meaning than its children).
d† contains much more information than d∗ . However, it still
protects sensitive information (removing specific identifying
information as well as the sensitivity of the type of drug used)
and preserves linguistic structure.
Instead of simply removing sensitive terms, the terms can
be hidden by more general but semantically related terms to
protect sensitive information without unnecessarily degrading
document utility. Based on this observation, the overall objectives of this paper are: (1) provide an information theoretic
approach to text sanitization, (2) develop efficient algorithms
to sanitize text documents based on the proposed information
theoretic measure, and (3) analyze possible attacks that the
proposed text sanitization approach can prevent, from the
perspective of existing privacy protection models.
A. Problem Overview
To avoid unnecessary distortion, our view of text document
security is as follows: given a threshold t and the set of word
ontologies (e.g., hypernym trees), a sanitized text should be a
plausible result of at least t base text documents. From this
point of view, we will develop information theoretic measures
and algorithms to sanitize text as shown in Figure 1(c). We
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Seat (50)

Agent (10)

Evidence (20)

Malignant_tumor (7)

Capital (32)

Drug (6)

Symptom (10)

Cancer (5)

State_capital (4)

Controlled_substance (2)

Denver, Indianapolis
Phoenix, Sacramento

Morphine
Marijuana

Lumbar_pain
Migraine
Fig. 2.

Carcinoma (2)

Liver_cancer
Lung_cancer

Word ontologies

A Sacramento resident purchased marijuana
for the lumbar pain caused by liver cancer.
(a) Sample text

A Sacramento resident purchased marijuana
for the lumbar pain caused by liver cancer.
(b) Sanitized text

A state capital resident purchased drug
for the pain caused by carcinoma.
(c) Semantic preserving sanitized text
Fig. 1.

Pain (2)

A sample text and its sanitized versions

make the following assumptions: Given a document and an
(possibly domain specific) ontology, we can identify a set of
sensitive words related to the document (e.g., using techniques
developed in [1], [8], [11] or domain specific knowledge). In
our problem domain, since sensitive words are the focal point,
without loss of generality, we assume a piece of text d only
contains sensitive values.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II
summarizes relevant current work and points out the differences; Section III proposes an information theoretic measure
according to the concept of t-plausibility and analyzes the
hardness of t-plausibility based text sanitization problem;
Section IV proposes uniform t-plausibility measure and an
effective and efficient text sanitization heuristic; Section VI
validates our analyses via experimental results and Section
VII concludes the paper with future research directions.
II. R ELATED W ORK
The existing work most related to ours is data anonymization and text de-identification. The most common data
anonymization technique is k-anonymity proposed in [9], [12].
Since then, there has been extensive work done related to
anonymizing structured information, i.e., datasets of at least
k tuples in relational format. The proposed work here focuses
on sanitizing a single text-based document without assuming

access to a collection of related documents. A document could
be transformed into a tuple in a relational format. Because
there are no well defined methods to transform a single
text document into a relational database of at least k tuples,
applying k-anonymization techniques here is not reasonable.
A. Text Anonymization
Much text anonymization work has mainly concentrated on
de-identification of medical documents. The Scrub system [11]
finds and replaces patterns of identifying information such as
name, location and medical terms with other terms of similar
type (e.g., an identified name is replaced with a fake name).
Similarly, [13] provides a six-step anonymization scheme to
find and replace identifying words with pseudonyms.
In [3], the authors present schemes for removing protected
health information (PHI) from free-text nursing notes. They
use pattern matching and heuristics to find PHI from nursing
notes. Moving away from purely syntactic based recognition
of identifying information, a semantic based approach [8]
uses MEDTAG, a specialized medical semantic lexicon. Using
the semantic tags and manually written disambiguation rules,
this system differentiates between words that have different
contextual meanings. The identifiers are then removed from
the medical records.
To our knowledge, there exists very little work that addresses the general problem of text sanitization. A two-phase
scheme that employs both sanitization and anonymization was
proposed in [10]. The sanitization step uses automatic named
entity extraction methods to tag the terms, and then replaces
them with dummy values. The anonymization phase is defined
based on k-anonymity and only applied on quasi-identifying
words (i.e., words presumed to be combinable with certain
external knowledge to possibly identify an individual). In [1],
an ontological representation of text document is used to
find and remove sensitive sentences. Pre-defined contextual
restrictions guide the sanitization procedure. Assuming the
existence of an external database containing demographic
information, suppression-based methods were introduced in
[2] to sanitized documents such that the resulting documents
cannot be linked to less than k records in the external database.
To summarize, existing work mainly focuses on how to
identify sensitive words, and either remove them or replace
them with pseudonyms. The replacement strategies lack a
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theoretic foundation, and consequently, without a formal measurement, it is difficult to judge the quality of sanitized documents. The work proposed here provides a theoretic measure
on the quality of sanitized documents from a privacy protection
point of view. These measures provide formal reasonings
on how and why a more general term is chosen to replace
sensitive information in a given document. In addition to
the given document, the only information available to us is
related word ontologies, or hypernym trees; and we do not
use domain-specific information extraction techniques. We use
WordNet [7] in our examples/experiments to retrieve word
ontologies and generate hypernym trees.
III. t-P LAUSIBILITY T EXT S ANITIZATION

Sacramento can be generalized to State capital, Capital and
so on. State capital can be generalized to Capital, Seat, etc.
The integer value, termed as volume, in the parentheses indicates how many base values can be generalized to its related
value. For instance, the value 32 associated with Capital (i.e.,
the volume of Capital) indicates that there are thirty-two base
values (including the four values shown at leaves) that can be
generalized to Capital. Note that the ontologies shown here
are not the complete ontology trees, and some branches are
omitted. The partial ontologies are extracted form WordNet,
but for practicality of illustration, we do not use complete
ontologies. Based on the previously introduced notations, we
define the following functions:




¯ o → w1 , . . . , wki , the word domain
1) W w̄i , d, d,
i

1 ≤ j ≤ ki and wi1 , . . . , wiki are base values in oi .1
For a generalized word w̄i , it returns a set of all possible
words at the same level of d[i] that can be generalized
to w̄
 i according to o.
¯ o → P rob (w  w̄i ), the local proba2) Po wi , w̄i , d, d,
i
bility function (Po (wi , w̄i ) for short):



¯o
• Pre-condition: wi ∈ W w̄i , d, d,
• Post-condition: The probability that given w̄i (or
d[i]), wi is the original word.
For a word wi in the domain of w̄i , it returns the

probability
 from wi .


 that w̄i is generalized
¯ o × · · · × W w̄m , d, d,
¯o ,
¯ o → W w̄1 , d, d,
3) D d, d,
¯ for short):
the text domain function (D(d)
¯
• Pre-condition: d  d according to o.
• Post-condition: D = {d1 , d2 , . . . , dk } and d ∈ D,


m
¯ o .
where k = i=1 ki and ki = W w̄i , d, d,
For a text d, its generalized counterpart d¯ and a set of
word ontologies, the function returns a set of all possible
texts that can be generalized to d¯ according to o. We call
such
 set as the
 domain of
 d. 
¯ o → P rob d  d¯ , the global plausibility
4) P d , d, d,
  
function (P d , d¯ for short):



¯o
• Pre-condition: d ∈ D d, d,
• Post-condition: The probability that d is generalized
from d .
For a text d in the domain of d, the function returns the
¯ That is, P
probability that d can be generalized to d.
returns the probability that d is the original text.

A. Basic Notations and Terminologies
For the remaining of this paper, the terms sanitization (sanitized) and generalization (generalized) are interchangeable.
The term “base text” refers a text that has not been sanitized
Let d be a base text, d¯ be a sanitized text, d[i]
in any way.

¯
or d[i] denote the ith term in d or d¯ (a term is a word,
or phrase recognized by the ontology; where we use “word”
it could also be such a short phrase) and |d| be the number
of terms in d. Because we merely consider sensitive words,
most often, d represents the set of sensitive words in the
original text. For example, suppose the text in Figure 1(a) is
the original text, then we have d = [Sacramento, marijuana,
lumbar pain, liver cancer]. Let  denote the generalization
operation between documents or terms.
Definition 1 (Generalizable ).
 We say that d is generalizable
¯ if |d| = d¯ and d[i] d[i]
¯ for 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
to d¯ (denoted as d d)
Since we only consider the base texts generalizable
to some
 
sanitized text, we always assume that |d| = d¯. Next, we list
additional notations adopted throughout the paper.
•
•

•

o = {o1 , . . . , om }: Word ontology set represented as a
set of word ontologies related to each word in d.
d = {w1 , . . . , wm }: A base text represented as a set of
terms, where |d| = m, wi ∈ oi for 1 ≤ i ≤ m. wi is
equivalent to d[i].
d¯ = {w̄1 , . . . , w̄m }: A generalized text represented as a
set of terms, where d¯ = m, w̄i ∈ oi and wi  w̄i . w̄i is
¯
equivalent to d[i].

In most situations, a set is considered as an ordered set.
For instance o[i] is the ith ontology of the ith word in d
¯
(i.e., d[i]). Similarly, d[i] can only be generalized to d[i].
Figure 2 contains four word hypernym trees used extensively
hereafter. The base values (sensitive values from the original
text) are at the bottom of the ontologies. Values in the nonleaf nodes can be generalized to any values on its path to
the root. For example, given the first ontology in Figure 2,

i

function (W (w̄i ) for short):
¯ and d  d¯ according to o.
• Pre-condition: w̄i = d[i]


j
k
1
• Post-condition: d[i] ∈ wi , . . . , wi i , wi  w̄i for

Before presenting the concept of t-plausibility sanitization
on text (t-PAT), we first introduce key notations and terminologies in Section III-A. The formal definition of t-PAT and
its hardness is presented in Section III-B.

Example 1. Refer to Figure 2, if w̄i = controlled substance,
then W (w̄i ) returns {Ecstasy, Marijuana}. Assuming uniform
distribution in W (w̄i ) and wi = marijuana, Po (wi , w̄i ) =
1
1
¯
|W (w̄i )| = 2 . Let d = {marijuana, lumbar pain} and d =
¯ o) returns d1 =
{controlled substance, pain}, then D(d, d,
{marijuana, lumbar pain}, d2 = {marijuana, migraine}, d3 =
1 Base
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values are the values from oi at the same level of wi in oi .

{ecstasy, lumbar pain} and d4 = {ecstasy, migraine}. If we
¯
¯
assume uniform distribution in both W (d[1])
and W (d[2]),
for
1
¯

1 ≤ i ≤ 4, P (di , d) = 4 .
B. Plausibility Sanitization on Text
Based on the previously introduced notations and terminologies, here we formally define our text sanitization problem.
Define the sanitization function f as
f : d, t, o → d¯
which takes a text d, security parameter or threshold t and a
¯ The security
set of ontologies o as the input and outputs d.
parameter basically restricts the set of possible outputs and is
defined as follows:
Definition 2 (t-Plausibility). d¯ is t-plausible if at least t base
texts (including d) can be generalized to d¯ based on o.
This definition simply says that a sanitized text d¯ can be
associated with at least t texts, and any one of them could be
the original text d. For instance, Let d¯ be the text in Figure
¯ =
1(c). Based on the word ontologies in Figure 2, |D(d)|
¯
96, and we say that d can be associated with 96 texts. If
t ≤ 96, d¯ satisfies the t-plausibility condition. When a text is
sanitized properly, we should not be able to uniquely identify
the original text. To prevent unique identification, there should
exist more than one text that could be the base text. These
texts are called plausible texts. The parameter t is defined as
a lower bound on the number of plausible texts related to a
given generalized text. t can also be considered as the degree
of privacy that a sanitized text needs to guarantee.
Based on t, we define the text sanitization problem as an
optimization problem. Since our intuition relies on the concept
of t-plausibility, we term the text sanitization problem as tPlausibility Sanitization on Text (t-PAT).
Definition 3 (t-PAT). The t-PAT problem is to find a sanitized
¯ such that d¯ is t-plausible and |D(d, d,
¯ o)| is minimal.
text d,
In other words, the t-PAT problem is to find a sanitization
¯ o)|, is equal to t or the least upper
d¯ of d, such that |D(d, d,
bound of t. We next show the hardness of t-PAT.
Theorem 1. t-PAT defined in Definition 3 is NP-Hard.
Proof: The reduction is from the subset product problem
(SPP), which is defined as follows: Given a set of integers I
and a positive integer p, is there any non-empty subset I  ⊆ I
such that the product of numbers in I  equals p? This problem
is proven to be NP-Complete [4]. We now show a reduction
from the subset product problem to t-PAT. Assume that there
exists an algorithm A that solves t-PAT in polynomial time.
For each wi (1 ≤ i ≤ m), define a set Mi containing the
volumes of the terms along the path from wi to w̄i , where
w̄i ∈ oi and wi  w̄i . The number of possible w̄i is limited by
the depth of the ontology. For example, refer to Figure 2, let
wi be the word Sacramento and w̄i be the word capital, then
Mi = {1, 4, 8}. The input to A are the sets M1 , . . . , Mm and
the plausibility parameter t. The solution of t-PAT is a set of

m

m numbers {n1 , . . . , nm } such that ni ∈ Mi , and i=1 ni is
equal to the least upper bound of t.
The input to SPP is the set of integers I = {a1 , . . . , am }
and the product p. Construct m sets by creating Mi = {ai , 1}
for 1 ≤ i ≤ m and invoke A with inputs M1 , . . . , Mm and
p. A returns a set of m numbers {n1 , . . . , nm }. SPP has a
m
m
solution iff i=1 ni = p. Suppose i=1 ni = p, then an
answer to SPP can be obtained by looking at {n1 , . . . , nm }
returned by A. If ni = 1, ai is not included in the subset. On
the other hand, if ni = ai , the subset contains the element ai .
Suppose there exists a subset I  ⊆ I such that their product
is p. Based on the input transformation, A returns I  as well.
Since the input and output transformations can be performed
in polynomial time, we can conclude that t-PAT is NP-hard.
C. Exhaustive Search with Pruning Strategy
To solve t-PAT, we can simply enumerate all possible solutions and pick the best one. This can be easily accomplished
by a recursive formulation. However, the exhaustive search is
inefficient and intractable for large values of m. We present
a pruning strategy that limits the search space to improve
search efficiency. ESearch Prune (Algorithm 1) is a recursive
procedure to generate combinations of generalizations of a
set of words d = {w1 , . . . , wm } with the given ontology
o = {o1 , . . . , om }. The procedure takes a set d¯ (current
generalization up to ith word), the index i, the best value for tPAT found so far as tc and its corresponding generalization d¯c .
¯ > tc
When i < m, d¯ is a partial generalization on d. If |D(d)|
then any superset d¯ of d¯ will be such that |D(d¯ )| > tc . This
observation guides the pruning process.
At step 2 of algorithm 1, hi denotes the height of the
hypernym tree oi of word wi , and w̄i+j indicates the j th
generalization (or hypernym) of wi on oi in ascending order
from wi to the root of the tree. wi = w̄i+0 is a special case.
If i < m, for each generalization of wi from w̄i+j to w̄i+hi ,
ESearch Prune is called again with i + 1. Note that w̄i+j is
+(j+1)
. The
selected in an ascending order such that w̄i+j  w̄i
recursion terminates when i equals m. When this occurs, the
¯ If this |D(d)|
¯ is less than tc ,
set d¯ is used to calculate |D(d)|.
¯ are returned
but greater than or equal to t then d¯ and |D(d)|
as the best solutions. Otherwise, tc and d¯c are returned.
Algorithm 1 lists the steps of a pruning based recursive
procedure. It is invoked as ESearch Prune(∅, 1, ∞, ∅) and the
returned values are the solutions to t-PAT.
IV. t-PAT R EVISITED
The optimal solution to the t-PAT problem defined in
Definition 3 may not be the best solution in practice because
it does not consider privacy protection of individual sensitive
words. It is possible that an optimal solution comes from
heavily generalizing only a few sensitive words. This can be
illustrated by the following example.
Example 2. Refer to Figure 1 and Figure 2. Let d be the text
in Figure 1(b). Suppose t = 32, then the optimal solution d¯
based on Definition 3 is:
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Algorithm 1 ESearch Prune(d̄, i, tc , d¯c ) - The Exhaustive
Search with Pruning for t-PAT
Require: d¯ a set containing i generalized words, i an index, tc
the current least upper bound on t, d¯c a generalization of
d whose |D(d¯c )| = tc and d, o, t are implicit parameters
1: if i < m then
2:
for j = 0 to hi do
3:
if |D(d¯ ∪ {w̄i+j })| > tc then
4:
return (tc , d¯c )
5:
end if
6:
(tc , d¯c ) ← ESearch Prune(d¯ ∪ {w̄i+j }, i + 1, tc , d¯c )
7:
if tc = t then
8:
return (tc , d¯c )
9:
end if
10:
end for
11: else
¯ < tc then
12:
if t ≤ |D(d)|
¯ d)
¯
13:
return (|D(d)|,
14:
end if
15: end if
16: return (tc , d¯c )

¯ t) is
generalization. For 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m, the cost function C(d,
defined as:
2
2 1 − α m
log t
α  ¯
H(
d)
−
log
t
+
)
−
(1)
H(
w̄
i
m2
m i=1
m
The intuition behind is that the first term defines a global
measure: how close the generalized text d¯ is to the expected
uncertainty defined by t. The second term defines a local
measure to achieve the uniform uncertainty (leading to uniform
t
plausibility) among all sensitive words. log
m is the expected
entropy of each sensitive word when the text is properly
generalized. Intuitively, the lower C, the better each sensitive
word is protected. Note that the denominators m2 and m are
used as scaling factors. Next we show how to calculate the
¯ H(w̄i ) can be calculate as:
entropies of w̄i and d.
ki

H(w̄i ) = −
j=1

¯ =−
H(d)

As shown in the example, in practice, not only do we need
to measure the quality of a generalized text d¯ using t, but also
we may need to preserve the privacy of every sensitive word.
To achieve this goal, we next present an information theoretic
measure based on the uniform plausibility assumption.
A. Uniform t-Plausibility and Information Theoretic Measure
Uniform plausibility implies that each sensitive word needs
to be protected unbiasedly. Under this uniform plausibility
requirement, we can avoid situations where some words are
generalized too much and other words are not generalized at
all. To materialize uniform plausibility, we utilize the expected
uncertainty of individual sensitive words as a measure. We use
entropy to model this uncertainty and to accomplish uniform
plausibility.
Let m be the number of words that need to be generalized
in d, H be an entropy function and α be a system parameter
governing the tradeoff between global optimality and uniform

k

¯ log P (di , d)
¯
P (di , d)

(3)

i=1

¯ D is the text domain function and P is
where k = |D(d)|.
the global plausibility function. Both functions are defined in
Section III-A. If we assume that each word is independent.
¯ can be calculated as follows:
P (di , d)
¯ =
P (di , d)

A state capital resident purchased drug
for the pain caused by carcinoma.
A better solution is to require that every sensitive word be
protected equally. If most of the sensitive words are not
generalized, then d¯ contains too much sensitive information.


(2)

where ki = |W (w̄i )| is the number of words that can be
generalized to w̄i . W is the word domain function and Po
is the local plausibility function. Both functions are defined in
¯ can be calculated as follows:
Section III-A. Similarly, H(d)

A capital resident purchased marijuana
for the lumbar pain caused by liver cancer.
The volume of capital is 32 (there are 32 base values generalizable to capital.) This implies that there are 32 possible texts
¯ However, from a privacy preserving
can be associated to d.
point of view, this d¯ does not protect privacy as well as the
following generalized text:

Po (wij , w̄i ) log Po (wij , w̄i )

m

¯
Po (di [j], d[j])

(4)

j=1

Example 3. Let w̄i be the state capital in Figure 2, and
assume uniform
 distribution in W (w̄i ). We can compute
H(w̄i ) = − 4j=1 14 log 14 = 2. Let d¯ be the sanitized text
in Figure 1(c) (i.e., d¯ = {state capital, drug, pain, carcinoma}). Let d be the original text in Figure 1(b) (i.e., d =
{Sacramento, marijuana, lumbar pain, liver cancer}). Assume
¯ =
uniform
in each w̄i (or d[i]). Then P (di , d)
 1 3 distribution
1
1
1
¯
= 32 , and since P (di , d) = 32 for 1 ≤ i ≤ 32,
4 · 2
¯ = − 32 1 log 1 = 5.
H(d)
i=1 32
32
Let α = 0.5 and t = 32. If d¯ = {capital, marijuana,
lumbar pain, liver cancer},
¯ t) =
C(d,
=

1
8

4

H(w̄i ) −
i=1

1
8

15
4

2

+

3
8

5
4

−

5
4

2

2

≈ 2.33

Nevertheless, if d¯ = {state capital, drug, pain, carcinoma},
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C(d¯ , t) =

1
8

=

1
8

4

H(w̄i ) −
i=1

3
4

2

+

3
8

−

5
4

2

1
4

2

≈ 0.09

Algorithm 2 LUB Search(d, t, o, δ) - The Least Upper Bound
Search for uniform t-PAT
Require: A base document d, a threshold t and a set of
hypernym trees o
1: for all wi ∈ d do


t
2:
Find a w̄i and H(w̄i ) = log
m
3: end for
¯ t)
4: c ← C(d,
5: if c = 0 then
6:
return d¯
7: end if
¯ ← One Step Alternative Search(d̄, d, t)
8: (c, d)
9: return d¯
¯ t). This
Clearly, C(d¯ , t) is a much smaller cost than C(d,
matches the intuition behind Equation 1 and implies that d¯
is a better sanitized text than d¯ from a privacy protection
perspective. Indeed, we can observe that d¯ achieves uniform
¯
plausibility better than d.

As mentioned before, the optimal solutions presented in
Section III-C do not take into account the concept of uniform
plausibility. That is, if d¯ is optimal according to Definition 3,
not all words in d are equally protected. This was shown in
Example 2. Whether or not uniform plausibility is achievable
depends on the structure of hypernym trees. At least by minimizing C, we can achieve some degree of uniform plausibility.
Our objective here is defined by the following definition:
Definition 4 (Uniform t-PAT). Give a text d, a set of
hypernym trees o (related to d), α value and a threshold t, find
¯ ≥ log t and C(d,
¯ t) is minimized.
a d¯ of d, such that H(d)
B. Proposed Heuristic
While a cleverly pruned exhaustive search can be used to
find the optimal solution, it is not practical for real-world use.
(We do present such optimal results, denote UEP, as a baseline
in the experiments.) Thus, in this section, we propose a
heuristic to generate sanitized texts that possess the property of
uniform plausibility. Since we need to know Po (wi , w̄i ) value
for each wi in W (w̄i ) to use the cost function C, for the rest
of this section, we assume that words are uniformly distributed
in each W (w̄i ). Let w̄i− and w̄i+ be the immediate hyponym
and hypernym of w̄i on the hyponym tree respectively.
LUB Search (Algorithm 2) consists of two main steps:
finding an upper bound on C, and performing greedy search to
improve the upper bound cost. Steps 1-3 of Algorithm 2 find a
generalized text d¯ such that the optimal cost is always less than
¯ t). Steps 5-7 check the condition C(d,
¯ t) = 0.
or equal to C(d,
If the condition holds, we know that d¯ is the best possible
solution, and no further computation is needed. If the condition
does not hold, the algorithm will continue to the greedy search
phase. The procedure One Step Alternative Search at step 8
of Algorithm 2 returns a generalized text that is either the same
as d¯ or a better generalized document according to Equation
1. Main steps of One Step Alternative Search are given in

Algorithm 3 One Step Alternative Search(d̄, d, t)
Require: d¯ a generalized text related to d and t is the privacy
threshold
¯
1: m ← |d|
¯ t)
2: tc ← C(d,
3: for i = 1 to m do
4:
for j = 1 to m do
5:
d¯ ← d¯−j ∪ {w̄i+ }
6:
if C(d¯ , t) < tc and H(d¯ ) > log t then
7:
tc ← C(d¯ , t)
d¯c ← d¯
8:
9:
end if
d¯ ← d¯−j ∪ {w̄i− }
10:
11:
if C(d¯ , t) < tc and H(d¯ ) > log t then
12:
tc ← C(d¯ , t)
d¯c ← d¯
13:
14:
end if
15:
end for
d¯ = d¯c
16:
17: end for
18: return (tc , d¯c )
Algorithm 3. During each iteration (the outer for-loop), 2m
possible one-step derivations from d¯ are generated, and the one
with the best cost is chosen to replace d¯ before next iteration.
LUB Search consists of two phases, and we analyze the
complexity of each phase independently. Assume the height of
every hypernym tree is bounded by h. The main cost of the first
phase (steps 1-3 of Algorithm 2) is to find the upper bound.
The upper bound for each word can be found in log h steps,
so the complexity of the first phase is bounded by O(m log h).
The second phase, One Step Alternative Search has the complexity of O(m2 ) Thus the complexity of LUB Search is
bounded by O(m2 ).
V. P RIVACY P ROTECTION AND OTHER P RACTICAL I SSUES
The proposed text sanitization model also performs well
against other models, such as k-Anonymity [9], [12] and
ERASE [2]. Due to space limitations, we omit the details
here. In short, the t-PAT model is more general in protecting
personal privacy. More detailed comparative analysis among
existing models can be found in our technical report [6].
We may ask whether the proposed approaches can be applied to sanitize a document? The answer is positive. However,
some cautions are needed. First, since document length varies,
choosing a value for t is difficult if we treat the document as a
very large piece of text. Also, to achieve uniform plausibility
with the same t value for all sensitive words in the document
may not be desirable because the degree of sensitivity may
vary from word to word. A more natural way to sanitize the
document is to break it into text segments. E.g., we can use
sentence, paragraph or section as a unit. Then sensitive words
can be identified and sanitize using various t values.
Identifying sensitive words is a challenging but a separate
problem. There are frameworks that have been proposed to
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solve the problem [1], [3], [11], [13]. These techniques are
domain specific, and additional documents may be required to
train the learning algorithms.
VI. E MPIRICAL A NALYSES
According to the proposed schemes, there are two aspects
of performance that we are most interested in: accuracy of the
heuristic and the running time. For the accuracy evaluation, we
measure the difference in generalization that is found by the
exhaustive search and the one found by the heuristic search.
For the running time evaluation, we measure the gain by
pruning-based search and heuristic search scheme over the
exhaustive search.
A. Data Description
For the purpose of experiments, a collection of 50 words
were selected randomly from the Wordnet tree hierarchy. The
chosen words are the leaf nodes falling under the “entity” tree
node where there are 30,000 possible words. These words were
selected such that the height of individual word hypernym
tree is close (±1) to 8 (the average height of hypernym tree
under “entity”). The words were subjected to only this height
constraint. Wordnet tree structures are kept for all the selected
words. If a word is generalizable to more than one sense,
the first sense is selected as default. In real scenarios, sense
disambiguation tools and domain knowledge may be used to
pick the sense pertaining to each word.
B. t-PAT
The ESearch Prune (EP) algorithm, introduced in Section
III-C, performs exhaustive search in the worst case. We
measure how the pruning strategy improves the performance
comparing as compared to the pure exhaustive search algorithm. Figure 3(a) shows the time complexity of EP, where
the x-axis shows different sizes of d varying from 10 to 50,
and the y-axis shows the running time in seconds. The curves
in the figures correspond to different t values from 1024 to
16384. We observe that the running time increases as the size
of d increases because when |d| is large, the search space
is also large. This observation is consistent for all t values.
When the size of d is fixed, the running time increases as
t increases since many generalized texts are checked before
the pruning condition becomes effective. These experiments
returned solutions with the exact t values.
In these figures, we do not show the running time of the
pure exhaustive search algorithm because the pure exhaustive
search is very inefficient. For |d| = 10, it took about 56
seconds to complete, and for |d| = 20, it took hours. For
any larger |d| values, we were not able to report the running
time within a reasonable amount of time. From Figure 3(a),
we can confirm that pruning strategy is effective.
C. Uniform t-PAT
The time complexity of Uniform ESearch Prune (UEP)
(Figure 3(b)) with α = 0.5, follows the same trend as EP.
This validates the proposed pruning strategy. The running

time for LUBS with One Step Alternative Search is much
less than the UEP. Also, the solution from LUBS with
One Step Alternative Search is same as that of UEP. We first
generated optimal solutions using UEP for t = 4096. Then we
executed LUBS with the same t value. Figure 3(c) shows the
result. The LUBS heuristic performs really well, and its result
is almost as good as the optimal solution. This matches our
intuition that optimal solution is spatially close around the
upper bound d¯ generated at steps 1-3 of Algorithm 2.
D. Uniform t-PAT vs. t-PAT
We have shown that the solution to the t-PAT problem does
not protect individual sensitive word equally. Here we validate
our claims through empirical results. With the same dataset,
first we generate (using the EP algorithm) the optimal solution
of t-PAT. We then compare this optimal solution with the
solution produced from UEP and LUBS. Figure 3(c) shows
¯ t) (Equation 1).
the result regarding the cost function C(d,
It can be observed that EP performs worse than LUBS. The
main reason is that EP always minimizes only the first term
¯ t). The LUBS greedy strategy
of the cost function in C(d,
outperforms EP because it produces almost optimal solutions
¯ t). Figure 3(d) shows the variance of
with respect to C(d,
individual word entropy. The smaller the variance is, the better
the uniform plausibility is achieved. LUBS achieves almost
optimal uniform plausibility. The same conclusion can be
drawn from Figure 3(e) which shows the maximum entropy of
individual words. We only show results with t = 4096 because
the observations do not vary much with other values. LUBS
is extremely close to the optimal, the α value can only affect
its behavior very little, which depends on the structure of the
hypernym trees as well.
We also measure the utility of the sanitized texts based on
Cosine Similarity since it is commonly used in information retrieval literature. Utility is defined as the similarity between the
¯ Let d∗ be
original document d and the sanitized document d.
a sanitized document produced from the existing suppressionbased techniques (i.e., sensitive words are removed). For
illustration purposes, let d = {“Diagnose”, “TB”} where
“TB” is the sensitive word. Assume both “TB” and “Bird flu”
can be generalized to “Infectious disease”. We have d¯ =
{“Diagnose”, “Infectious disease”} and d∗ = {“Diagnose”,
*}. The normalized frequency vectors are: f d = √12 , √12 ,
1
and f d∗ = √12 , 0 . Note that the frequency
f d¯ = √12 , 2√
2
of non-sensitive word does not change, the frequency of the
second word in d∗ is 0 since it was suppressed, and the
frequency of “Infectious disease” in d¯ is divided between
“TB” and “Bird Flu”. The cosine similarity is the dot product
of these normalized frequency vectors. It is clear that the
similarity between d and d¯ is greater than that between d and
d∗ . This result can be generalized to any document, and the
proposed approach produces better results than suppressionbased techniques. Figure 3(f) shows the similarity score between d and d∗ , where the UEP algorithm was used for
anonymization with an α value of 0.50.
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VII. C ONCLUSION : ABOUT S EMANTICS ?
While we have given an information-theoretic measure of
privacy and cost of anonymization, what does this do to the
text in practical terms? Fully evaluating this would require
analyzing this with real readers; such a human subjects study
is well beyond the scope of this paper. However, we here
present an example, “Uses marijuana for phantom limb pain”,
to demonstrate both the privacy- and semantics- preserving
qualities of our approach. This example was chosen before we
had developed the measures and algorithms, as an example of
text that is clearly sensitive (use of an illegal drug), highly
individually identifiable (phantom limb pain only occurs in
amputees), and contains none of the quasi-identifiers listed
in the HIPAA safe harbor rules. Defining marijuana and
phantom limb pain as sensitive, and with α = 0.5 and t = 10,
the sentence sanitizes (using all approaches) to “uses soft drug
for pain.” This eliminates both sensitivity and identifiability,
while preserving readability and much of the semantics.
While further evaluation and development is necessary, we
believe that t-PAT provides a valuable supplement to more
traditional text sanitization methods, reducing both sensitivity
and identifiability of items that remain even after traditional
(quasi-)identifiers have been removed.
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